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Wall Street’s Subprime Debacle:
Firsthand Accounts from Inside the CDO Machine*
Matthew A. Lieber† and Steven H. Kasoff‡
The primary catalyst that triggered the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09 was the
market for subprime mortgage securities in the US. The engine driving the subprime surge,
collateralized debt obligations—CDOs—have been much cited but less well understood.
Using new securitization and derivative products, along with unprecedented leverage, CDOs
enabled dealers and investors to multiply and concentrate subprime risk to the point that it
became a systemic threat. This market grew rapidly during the years preceding the crisis,
fueled by aggressive (and often fraudulent) mortgage loan underwriting, unrealistic
expectations for continued growth in home prices, and highly levered institutions with
access to artificially low interest rates.
The observations, perceptions, and actions of participants in the subprime markets remain
poorly documented and incompletely understood. Seeking to deepen our understanding,
this study has produced seven interview summaries and one article telling the story of a
hypothetical CDO deal.
This article is organized in four parts. First, it presents our research questions and methods
in relation to the existing knowledge on the topic. Second, it describes what we think are the
study’s main contributions. Third, it previews the Lessons Learned summaries and
interviews from each of the participants. And last, it identifies what we believe are some of
the unique values from the project.
1. Research Questions, Existing Knowledge, and Our Methods
The aims of this study are to document and probe the mix of economic assumptions,
investment strategies, and incentives at work—and to test the validity of certain wellestablished narratives. We interviewed a set of individual market participants—financial
engineers, marketers, executives, analysts, and investors—who collectively made up “the
CDO machine.” In one-to-two-hour-long interviews, we asked them about their experiences
at the forefront of CDO markets in relation to the following questions:
•

*

†
‡

How did the novel capabilities unleashed by the CDO markets interact with the
strategic mindsets and operational thinking inside Wall Street dealer firms?

This article is part of a special project of the Yale Program on Financial Stability Lessons Learned Oral History
Project: Inside the CDO Machine, which can be accessed at our website here,
https://som.yale.edu/centers/program-on-financial-stability/lessons-learned-oral-history-project.
Interviewer, Yale Program on Financial Stability Lessons Learned Oral History Project.
Yale School of Management Fellow and former equity partner and head of real estate and structured products
investments at the Elliott Management Corp., a global hedge fund.
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•

What motivated hedge funds and other investors to short subprime securities? And
how did their thinking and actions evolve from 2004 to 2008?

•

Were the buyers of CDOs naive? What made CDOs so appealing to them?

•

Why were the rating agencies incapable of accurately assessing the risk of CDOs?

•

What led Wall Street dealers to shift from producing CDOs for sale to taking risk
positions in them?

Research involving the subprime collapse has tended to follow one of two tracks. On the one
hand, scholars and policy experts investigating the financial crisis have focused on
institutional factors such as excessive leverage, regulatory fragmentation, and a vulnerable
shadow banking regime.1
These structural accounts identify the subprime debacle as the trigger of a larger financial
crisis that was driven by multiple causes.2 Not surprisingly, multistranded explanations
replete with impersonal, and often arcane, causes are hard for even the most informed
observers to digest and disseminate.
On the other hand, narrative treatments of the subprime CDO markets featuring human-level
accounts have reached a wider audience. In these works, journalists and filmmakers tell
compelling stories and provide more salient, monocausal explanations.3 Their narrative
accounts offer vivid human color and suspense, with a seductive Wall Street villain lurking
at any turn. The adaptation of these works to film was natural, appropriate, and broadly
influential.4

1

2

3

4

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, 2011) [URL: https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/financial-crisis-inquiry-commission-0].
See also Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, “The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009,” in Routledge Handbook of
Major Events in Economic History, eds. Robert Whaples and Randall Parker (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013)
[URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003388].
FCIC Report 2011, and Frederic S. Mishkin, “Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 1 (2011): 49–70.
Two important books are Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2011) and Gregory Zuckerman, The Greatest Trade Ever: The Behind-the-Scenes Story of How John
Paulson Defied Wall Street and Made Financial History (New York: Broadway Business, 2009). Andrew Ross
Sorkin’s Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial
System (New York: Penguin Books, 2010) also reports on CDO markets within the urgent crisis dealings of big
bank CEOs and Washington leaders.
The film The Big Short (directed by Adam McKay, Paramount Pictures, 2015, 130 minutes) grossed
$133 million worldwide. Margin Call (J.C. Chandor, Lionsgate, 2011, 109 minutes) is a critically acclaimed
thriller inspired by Lehman Brothers. Inside Job (Charles Ferguson, Sony Pictures Classics, 2010, 108 minutes)
won the 2010 Academy Award for Best Documentary. The film Too Big to Fail (Curtis Hanson, HBO Films,
2011, 98 minutes), based on the Sorkin book, featured William Hurt as Hank Paulson and Paul Giamatti as
Ben Bernanke and earned 10 Emmy award nominations.

372

Wall Street’s Subprime Debacle

Lieber and Kasoff

Analytically, the methods involved in the narrative recountings have a number of issues.
Beginning with the raw material, first person accounts of key market actors can be difficult
to access and assemble. They are time-consuming (if not impossible) to collect, and they are
one-sided by definition. The statements can be unreliable if the human source is motivated
to embellish or obfuscate. Moving along, creating a narrative from the anecdotal data—the
journalist’s art—is another major step. Packaging these narratives into a book with an arc
and then dramatizing the book into a gripping film are third and fourth levels of art. For the
reporting that they do and the powerful narratives that they create, these books and films
have contributed a good deal to public and elite understanding of the financial crisis. And
then they stopped, around 2011. No one wanted to read the story anymore.
Not surprisingly, much of the storytelling in the narrative treatments of the crisis (and
particularly in the subprime CDO markets) paints an unrealistic, binary picture in which
some people were fools and others had perfect knowledge and vision. What
misunderstandings the narrative works have created and popularized is an open question.
Thus, the key focus in our interviews has been on the omissions in both strands of the
literature:
•

What important details and events did the writers cut from the books and the films
because they were too arcane, too messy, or morally ambiguous?

•

What did market actors know, see, experience, or later realize? And how does their
intelligence square or not with institutional knowledge from the more academic
accounts?

One other factor limiting the popular works is their timing. Concentrated around 2010, the
books and films lack the perspective and knowledge available to us and our interviewees in
2021. For example, the popular works tend to lump together the subprime debacle and the
GFC, even though it is not obvious why the subprime bust spread as widely as it did.5
Why and how did a small amount of subprime mortgages trigger a systemic financial crisis?
As we now know,6 the permissive stance of regulators, rating agencies, and central banks
created the conditions in which the largest, most globally integrated Wall Street dealer firms
used derivatives to recklessly amass excessive leverage. Multiple weak spots together made
the system vulnerable in a big way. The subprime CDO bust was an intervening event, related
to the systemic vulnerability in multiple ways. Yet, the predominant person-based narratives
turn the CDO business into a monolithic Wall Street actor and the main cause of the GFC. The
linkage between subprime markets and the Global Financial Crisis goes beyond such extant
5

6

Gary Gorton, “The Big Short Shrift,” review of The Big Short and The Greatest Trade Ever, Journal of Economic
Literature 49, no. 2 (June 2011) [URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1768032].
Gorton criticizes the books by Lewis and Zuckerman for the limits of their economic vision and the absence
of a larger explanation.
See Larry Cordell, Greg Feldberg, and Danielle Sass, “The Role of ABS CDOs in the Financial Crisis,” Journal of
Structured Finance 25, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 10–27. [URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3443043]. See
also FCIC Report 2011, Mishkin 2011, and Gorton and Metrick 2013.
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CDO machine-based popular explanations. “There is no substitute for digging into the
workings of the financial machine,” as Adam Tooze writes, for it is “there we will find both
the mechanism that tore the world apart and the reason why that disintegration came as
such a surprise.”7 The findings from the interviews help us understand what went wrong.

2. A Deeper Understanding
This study contributes in three ways toward a richer, more accurate understanding of the
mindsets and incentives at work in the subprime CDO machine. First, by interviewing
financial industry professionals who were leading players in the market at the time, it offers
a valuable window into the mindset of market participants. With their firsthand knowledge
of the CDO machine, market participants bring a perspective and intelligence that are distinct
from those of regulators, analysts, or scholars. The legal and reputational concerns that they
have as financial industry leaders, however, often make it difficult if not impossible to access
their views in detail as this study has done. By collecting input from seven actors across the
industry, the study offers a sampling of market thinking and a more balanced picture than
reports focusing on one person or institution. The interviewees represent a cross section of
the industry. They include voices from the structuring units, institutional sales, executive
ranks, the buy side, a rating agency, and hedge funds; represented are investors taking both
short and long positions.
Second, the collection summarizes the most important lessons learned from each of its
interviewees and highlights distinctive perspectives of each. The insights from the human
source narratives have been enriched from hindsight. The intervening years have allowed
the interviewees to reflect on the period and to incorporate the latest knowledge of the
financial crisis, including, for example, the relationship between the subprime boom and the
GFC.
Third, in the “Anatomy of a Trade: The Making of a Subprime CDO” article, the collection
presents an integrated snapshot—in fictionalized form—of the CDO machine and how it
worked. The reader will recognize the patterns identified in the summaries. The Anatomy of
a Trade article integrates the different perspectives in the form of one hypothetical deal,
sketching for the reader how the various pieces and agents involved in this one trade fit
together.
Considering the interviews as a unit, a number of common themes emerge. First, there was
enormous complexity and uncertainty about the direction of the market, even as it began to
unravel in 2007. Second, in their own way, each participant spotted warning signs well
before the crisis hit. Simultaneously, it made sense for each—industry norms and market
forces exerted pressure on them—to continue to support the production of CDOs in greater
volumes and further on the timeline than they otherwise might have. Third, the application
of financial models developed for conventional credit instruments to housing-backed
7

Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (London: Penguin Books, 2018),
22.
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securities was mistaken, but this mistake was murky at the time (and it remains so). The
rating agencies, under new financial pressure, played a key role as gatekeeper sanctioning
subprime CDO investments. Fourth, an overwhelming force that all actors testify to is the
remarkable demand for higher-yield credit at the time. Meanwhile, fifth, the regulatory
regime enabled large institutions to leverage positions on highly rated CDOs without limit.
Sixth, the regulatory authorities allowed institutions to invent and operate a subprime
market without reliable guardrails. Seventh, excessive leverage at banks was becoming a
systemic flaw. Large financial institutions made many large mistakes, though they varied in
their capability to correct, absorb, and recover from them. Eighth, large mistakes became
massive and systemically destructive only within those institutions that had thrown off the
controls and removed risk management tasks and responsibilities from their operational
units.
By sharing with us their recollections and their keenest lessons learned over the ensuing
decade, our interviewees provide accounts that help us put together the pieces of the
systemic debacle. These market participants explain in detail a number of ways that the CDO
market failed to function. Crucial to their testimonials, however, is the dilemma of localized
market intelligence and tunnel vision. While each participant recognized certain warning
signs during 2007–08, at the time, none of them could entirely see the broader picture of
dysfunction. Each was wrapped up in a subsection of the CDO market, a midlevel operator
or a rising executive, unable or unwilling to see the big picture. Describing a kind of financial
“fog of war,” their accounts reveal human and institutional elements of uncertainty, career
hierarchies, and personal interactions within the CDO market that influenced their actions.

3. Highlights from the Individual Interviewees
The following summaries and the full interviews give voice to a variety of individual
experiences and takeaways, which we summarize here.
Kicking off the interview series, our coauthor Steve Kasoff provides background on the credit
derivatives business. From his experience in the 1990s with Wall Street dealers, he traces
the development of CDOs in their first instance to distressed debt from commercial real
estate failures. Hedge funds recognized an investment opportunity, Kasoff explains, giving
wind to the sector. CDOs made up of pools of debt from various industries gone wrong
enabled them to extract value from undervalued assets.
In the early 2000s, the inclusion of residential mortgage debt in CDOs and the ensuing
demand from large banks and insurers triggered a further round of innovation. The “pay-asyou-go” credit default swap (CDS) enabled more investors, on a global scale, to join the
subprime boom using synthetic CDOs. Kasoff explains how the regulatory regime and the
role of the rating agencies were crucial to the CDO machine. Notably, regulators did not
require insurers to hold capital against CDS exposures. Meanwhile, rating agencies provided
the AAA ratings that institutional investors needed, using faulty models and brushing off
criticism on their way to record profits from CDO issuances. Shorting subprime CDOs was
more fraught, lonely, and costly than many imagine, Kasoff explains. When the downturn did
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come, it occurred far more suddenly and massively than anyone in the market had been
expecting—including short sellers.
Few parts of the subprime CDO machine gained more infamy from the events of 2007–08
than the rating agencies. Eric Kolchinsky, a former Moody’s analyst, explains how a once
stodgy, marginal institution transformed into a competitive oligopoly bent on maximizing
profits—and why the agencies fell short in their risk assessment. Formerly private
partnerships, the rating agencies became publicly held companies dedicated to shareholder
value during this time. The surging credit derivative industry presented major challenges to
the agencies, which were not accustomed or equipped to analyze complex structured
products. In the absence of an optimal methodology, profit incentives spurred agency
directors to normalize the use of inapt models and faulty assumptions. A whistleblower in
2009, Kolchinsky reflects on rating agency reform a decade later: while there has been
widespread recognition that rating agency shortcomings were central to the subprime boom
and bust, post-crisis reforms were relatively minor. In contrast to bank regulation, the rating
agency regime continues along the same general lines—and with some of the same
vulnerabilities.
The generalized blindness to systemic risk in 2005–07 takes specific form in Sohail Khan’s
discussion of investment mindsets among dealers and institutional clients. As managing
director for fixed-income sales at Citigroup during the period, Khan handled accounts of both
large institutional investors and hedge funds. In his interview, Khan identifies what he calls
three “fundamental truths”—core assumptions that were absolutely unquestionable in the
minds of market participants at the time: (1) housing prices never go down nationally; (2)
any losses will be normally distributed; and (3) you can break up debt products. Khan’s
anecdotes provide more than one breathtaking example of these kinds of blindness, which
were shared by producers, rating agencies, and investors. The overriding priority of dealers
was to maximize revenue from fees by producing and moving greater CDO volumes. At peak
boom, Wall Street firms shifted to holding tranches of CDOs they had produced. But not all
of the big dealers were reckless in the same measure—a crucial detail that emerges from
Khan’s interview. What he calls the “provenance” of the CDO structuring group—where it
originated from and sat in relation to the firm’s institutional hierarchy—shaped its approach
to risk management.
Brian Stoker offers a strong argument for the logic of US credit markets, a damning
indictment of top leadership at two Wall Street firms, and criticism of the financial regulatory
regime before and after the crisis. As a midlevel banker at Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, Stoker
structured CDOs, managed the warehouses, and then helped liquidate the firm’s book as the
market began to tank in 2007. He explains how regulatory practices facilitated the expansion
of CDO issuance. Allowing insurers to allocate zero capital against their swap exposures
made the negative basis trade easy. It became advantageous for dealers to buy and hold AAA
tranches, Stoker explains, detailing their off-balance-sheet maneuvers to grow their upside
exposure. Investors and dealers were not behaving fraudulently, Stoker makes clear, but
rather in a self-interested way within the permissive rules and norms of the system. The
glaring malpractice he attests to occurred at the senior management level of the largest
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banks, who closed their eyes to the growing risk in the interests of short-term profits.
Financial crises happen every 10 years, Stoker concludes, yet each one tends to be dismissed
as an unforeseen “100-year event.”
Dubbed “the grandfather of CDOs,” Chris Ricciardi brings a perspective that encompasses his
successive roles as pioneering financial engineer, field general running production armies,
and buy-side executive. The essential purpose of a CDO, Ricciardi clarifies, is to create longterm leverage on an illiquid asset. He takes issue with several popular conceptions: short
selling did not cause the financial crisis, nor were rating agencies to blame for modeling
home values using the inflated prices that they had been appraised at; furthermore, the
volume of asset-backed securities (ABS) issuance was too small to have caused the GFC.
Rather, Ricciardi highlights the “funding mismatch” within large institutions that took longterm risk while funding it with very short-term liabilities. The concentration of risk in certain
large overleveraged investment banks created a systemic vulnerability. In the absence of any
regulatory limit on short selling, the massive volume of shorts drove other CDO investors to
sell at massive losses. Had the securities been held to maturity, the recovery in housing
prices would have undone any major losses. Ricciardi expresses support for a limit on the
volume of shorts.
As the boom accelerated, it spawned a cottage industry known as the CDO manager.
Overwhelming demand for CDOs spurred dealer firms to outsource the management of the
CDOs. Veteran Wall Street insider Jim Finkel takes us through the short rise and fall of the
CDO manager niche from his experience. The CDO manager would select the portfolio of
assets for a CDO, working closely with the dealer that would market the CDO to investors.
The CDO manager then managed those assets over the lifetime of the CDO. The business
model was fee based with relatively fixed costs and a strong incentive to increase assets
under management.
The prudent investment philosophy that Finkel instilled in his firm soon ran against the
pressures of the market. He saw the CDO manager’s role as clearly on the buy side, but many
manager firms aligned more with the dealers in their behavior. With global investors
crowding into the market on the buy side, Wall Street dealers pushed CDO managers to select
dubious investments. Finkel’s Dynamic Credit Partners avoided buying the most toxic assets;
he later discovered that some of these were designed for short sellers. The problem of CDOs
as an asset class, Finkel concludes, was not the design of the security but rather the velocity
and volume of the debt being securitized during the boom. The rating agencies succumbed
to a perverse incentive to sign off on senior CDO tranches as being AAA quality. Major dealer
firms were riven and out of control, addicted to fee revenue from CDO issuance. US
regulators were mistaken, Finkel suggests, in failing to rein in these players.
Stephen King shares a vivid perspective on the subprime CDO market saga from his position
as head of an ABS correlation desk at Barclays. Managing a delta-hedged portfolio of credit
derivatives required King to constantly evaluate market assumptions in relation to his own
assumptions. Hedging to limit risk, constantly updating his model, and stress testing his
portfolio before the crisis enabled King and his team to emerge whole—an exception among
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CDO market makers. They observed the surge in demand on the part of large banks for AAA
risk. The high yields from CDOs enabled the banks to subsidize their corporate credit lending
operations, a core business, that were hard-pressed by the low interest rate environment.
The herd behavior into CDOs made a mistaken market consensus even more damaging,
worsening the collapse that would come.

4. Bringing It All Together; Looking Back and Looking Ahead
Considered together, the testimonials of these market participants provide a perspective
distinct from those of the crisis response actors commonly profiled—the lawyers, regulators,
and economists leading the government authorities. Interestingly, in comparison to the
government actors, the market participants we interviewed are equally nuanced in their
assessments of 2007 and 2020 but consistently more negative about the present and future
crisis outlook. Regarding the pandemic crisis and the sharp but brief recession it caused, they
recognize the crucial success of the federal interventions of 2020. Looking forward, they
express concerns about the risks from moral hazard, overborrowing, and the unintended
consequences of repeated massive interventions.
Lastly, in addition to the interview summaries, the “Anatomy of a Trade” article presents a
parable, a sketch in eight parts of a single fictitious subprime CDO transaction. Informed by
expert interviews, documentary research, and the author’s firsthand experience, the
anatomy breaks down the different parts of the CDO origination process and shows the ways
that they connect. It reveals the sequence of key events in the creation of a typical CDO.
Beginning with a hedge fund manager’s proposal, moving to a large Wall Street dealer, then
proceeding to a buy-side investor’s discussion, each scene reveals different players
interacting with each other. Their give and take reflects the various perspectives
documented in the expert interviews within one imaginary deal.
Delving into the details of the subprime CDO trade of 2005–07 is potentially valuable in two
regards. First, it helps us better understand the Global Financial Crisis, specifically the ways
that the subprime market was connected to structural vulnerabilities that propelled
contagion through a global system. Second, beyond the GFC, we suspect that students of
financial crises will recognize patterns in the CDO machine that transcend this particular era
and relate to other crises—past, present, and future.
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